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In this paper we are concerned with reasoning about agents with emotions. To
be more precise: we aim at a logical account of emotional agents. The very topic
may already raise some eyebrows. Reasoning / rationality and emotions seem
opposites, and reasoning about emotions or a logic of emotional agents seems a
contradiction in terms.
However, emotions and rationality are known to be more interconnected than
one may suspect. There is psychological evidence that having emotions may help
one to do reasoning and tasks for which rationality seems to be the only factor [1].
Moreover, work by e.g. Sloman [5] shows that one may think of designing agent-
based systems where these agents show some kind of emotions, and, even more
importantly, display behaviour dependent on their emotional state. It is exactly in
this sense that we aim at looking at emotional agents: artiﬁcial systems that are
designed in such a manner that emotions play a role. Also in psychology emotions
are viewed as a structuring mechanism. Emotions are held to help human beings
to choose from a myriad of possible actions in response to what happens in our
complex world (cf. [3]).
So we advocate the use of emotional states to design an artiﬁcial intelligent
agent. One has to bear in mind, that this has in itself nothing to do with the
philosophical and very diﬃcult question whether these agents really possess true
emotions in the sense that we humans do! This is similar to the question whether
artiﬁcial agents possess true intelligence or consciousness like humans do. One
can perfectly well think about the design of intelligent agents without addressing
this issue. In this paper we argue that emotions make sense in describing the
behaviour of certain intelligent agents, and may help structuring the design of
the agent (by means of an architecture that caters for emotional aspects) and
consequently it is useful to reason about emotions of an agent, or rather about
the emotional states an agent may be in, together with its eﬀects on the agent’s
actions, as an important aspect of the agent’s behaviour.
So our logic is more concerned with the behaviour of such a system than with
emotions per se. This is a perfectly sensible way to go in line with software and
system engineering practice. To specify systems in a rigourous way one may employ
certain logical methods by which one can unambigously state how the system
should behave. In agent-based systems where the agents are perceived as rational
or intelligent ones, possessing some sort of attitudes pertaining to information
and motivation such the well-known BDI (belief–desire–intention) agents, we can
describe their behaviour in terms of the evolution of the mental states of the agent
375over time (e.g. BDI logic [4], and KARO logic [2]). We now want also perceive
emotional agents as systems that evolve over time and can be described by some
logic as the one mentioned above for rational agents. So what we aim at is
describing behaviours of emotional agents in terms of the way their (emotional)
states evolve over time. This means that we are interested in at least two things:
how do actions of agents (by deﬁnition agents act!) change their emotional states
and how do emotional states determine what action is taken and what eﬀect is
obtained from this in the given state.
The way the full paper proceeds is as follows. From the psychological literature
we get evidence that the way emotions inﬂuence behaviour is on a rather high
level. Emotions like happiness and fear generally do not result directly in taking
concrete actions by agents, but rather in an attitude towards handling their goals
and intentions. Emotions moderate the execution and maintenance of the agent’s
agenda, so to speak. It will turn out that we can model these high-level attitudes
adequately in the logical framework that we have devised for rational agents. In
essence our approach is thus: to reason about the dynamics of (emotional) states
we use the framework of dynamic logic and (an extension of) the KARO framework
([2]) in particular. In the full paper we provide KARO-style formulas expressing
emergence of the four basic emotions of happiness, sadness, anger and fear, as
well as their inﬂuence on the agent’s deliberative behaviour. A simpliﬁed example
for illustrating the ﬂavor of these formulas is the following: I(π,ϕ) ∧ Com(π) →
[π](Bϕ → happy(,ϕ,ϕ)), expressing that an agent that was committed to a plan
π which it intended to do with ϕ as goal, and that believes that its goal ϕ is realised
after having executed/performed its plan π, is indeed happy with this (w.r.t. this
goal ϕ and a (by now) empty plan ).
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